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CHAPTER I 
AN INTRODUCTION TO BRITISH CENSORSHIP 
The mention of World War I brings to the minds of most 
people a picture of one of the most terrible military strug­
gles that the modern world has had to face. But it should 
also be remembered that war brought with it more than simply 
military action, among other things the war brought on a 
vigorous propaganda campaign waged by all of the belligerent 
powers. As the United States was the largest, and potenti­
ally the most powerful of the neutral states, it was natur­
ally one of the most sought after of the neutral countries. 
As Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Minister, said in 
this regard, "it was a factor so potentially important that 
its attitude might be decisive in deciding the war in favor 
1 
of either set of the belligerents." 
It is generally felt that one of the major factors in 
bringing the United States into the war (April 6, 1917) was 
the success of the British propaganda campaign. It has been 
1 
Viscount Grey of Fallodon, Twenty-five Years, 1892­
1916 (New York: Fredrick A. Stokes Co., 1925), II, 168. 
2 
said that, "shrewdly emphasizing all the darker aspects of 
German conduct and thought~ while doing the precise reverse 
for its own nation's, the British propaganda was a force of 
1 
real potency in compelling the decision of April." Since 
the American shift away from neutrality was of such great 
importance, and since the British propaganda effort was a 
factor contributing toward that shift, that propaganda effort 
merits much attention. 
Several students of the period have published some 
outstanding works on the overall subject of propaganda and 
the war. Notable among these are Horace C. Peterson's, 
Propaganda for War: The Campaign against American Neutrality 
1914-1917, and Harold D. Lasswell's Propaganda Technique in 
the World War. However, a study of British censorship and 
news control as a method of propaganda is notably lacking from 
the studies of propaganda and World War T. It is, therefore, 
the purpose of this thesis to examine British censorship and 
news control as a method of propaganda in the United States 
1 
James Duane Squires, British Propaganda at Home and in 
the United States from 1914-1917 (Cambridge: Harvard University
_... _-- _..... .­
Press, 1935), p. 66. 
3 
prior to the American involvement in the First World War. 
An effort will be made to determine whether this campaign 
was in fact a major factor contributing toward the eventual 
American involvement. 
However, before examining the question of censorship 
and news control, it is essential that one have a general 
understanding of the total British propaganda effort in the 
United States and the relative role of censorship and news 
control to that campaign. 
George Viereck has said, "Propaganda is a campaign 
camouflaging its origin, its motive, or both, conducted for 
the purpose of obtaining a specific objective by manipulating 
1 
public opinion." While the author of this statement was 
apparently one of the leading figures in the German propa­
ganda campaign, his definition is equally applicable to the 
British effort. In fact, to a great extent the British 
propaganda effort seems to more nearly resemble this general 
definition than did the German propaganda endeavor, for it 
1 
George Sylvester Viereck, Spreading Germs of Hate 
(London: Duckworth, 1931), p. 23. 
4 
was much more successful in camouflaging both its origin and 
its motive than was its German counterpart. 
The British propaganda campaign began almost at the 
moment that Great Britain entered the conflict. One of the 
first British offensive actions of the war (August 5, 1918) 
was to send out the cable ship Telconia to cut the five 
1 
German submarine cables that ran through the English Channel. 
The tremendous importance of this destruction of the German 
submarine cables to the success of the British propaganda 
effort will become more and more evident as this study unfolds. 
The first move of the British propagandists was, of 
course, quickly followed by a second. This was the establish­
ment of government control over the press and means of communi­
cation within Great Britain. This government control was 
established by a number of Orders in Council dating from 
August 8, 1914, and finally by the Defense of the Realm 
2 
(Consolidation) Act of November 28, 1914. 
1 
Barbara Tuchman, The Zimmermann Telegram (New York: 
Macmillan, 1966), pp. 10-11. 
2 
W. H. Aggs (Ed.), Chitty'~ Statutes of Practical 
Utility, 6th Edition, 1914-1916 (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 
Limited and Stevens and Sons, Limited, 1917), ~~III, 463. 
5 
Thus with the major German methods of communication with 
the United States cut and the press and means of communication 
within Great Britain under government control, the British 
propagandists were able to turn their full attention to con­
vincing the world of the rightousness of the British cause. 
An analysis of that propaganda effort would be a re1a­
tive1y simple task if that effort was clearly defined and 
under the leadership of a single organization. However, as 
is often the case in any historical study, the problem is 
not so simple. Censorship of the press and means of communi­
cation within Great Britain was established at least as much 
for purely defensive reasons as for propaganda purposes, and 
no one organization had total responsibility for the entire 
propaganda campaign. As one student of the period has 
described it: 
Until February 1918 British propaganda was carried 
on by various ministries interested in spreading a 
point of view, and by Wellington House, "an adjunct 
of the Foreign Office." In December 1916 a department 
of information . . . was set up and put in charge of 
all British propaganda. In February 1918 . . . a 
Ministry of Information under Lord Beaverbrook replaced 
6
 
the Department of Information. 1
 
In addition, not all of the British propaganda efforts 
in the United States were carried out by government agencies. 
Many private organizations engaged in propaganda activities 
favoring the British cause. Some of the most outstanding of 
these unofficial propaganda organizations were: (1) the Oxford 
Faculty, (2) The Par1imentary Recruiting Committee, (3) the 
Cobden Club, (4) the Fight for Right Movement, (5) a group 
of Ange1ican clerics, (6) United Workers, (7) Atlantic Bu1­
1etin, (8) Overseas Club, (9) Victoria League, (10) Union of 
Democratic Control, and (11) The Central Committee for National 
Patriotic Organizations. 2 
Much of the propaganda work of the British government 
in neutral countries was carried out by Wellington House under r" 
3the leadership of Charles Masterman. It was the duty of one 
branch of Wellington House to carry out the British propaganda 
campaign in the United States. This branch of Wellington House 
1 
John L. Martin, International Propaganda; Its Legal 
and Diplomatic Control (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1958), pp. 34-5. 
2
 
Squires, £E. cit., pp. 17-25.
 
3Ibid ., p. 31. 
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was headed by Sir Gilbert Parker, who later outlined his 
activities in this endeavor as follows: 
Practically since the day the war broke out . . . I 
became responsible for American publicity . . . . Among 
the activities was a report to the British Cabinet on 
the state of American opinion, and constant touch with 
the permanent correspondents of American newspapers in 
England. I also frequently arranged for important 
public men in England to act for us by interviews in 
American newspapers . . . 
Among other things, we supplied three hundred and 
sixty newspapers in the smaller cities . . . with an 
English newspaper . . . . We established contact with 
the man in the street through interviews, articles, 
pamphlets, etc.; .... We advised and stimulated 
many people to write articles . . . and established 
association, by personal correspondence with influential 
and eminent people of every profession in the United 
States . . . . Besides an immense private correspondence 
with individuals, we had our documents and literature 
sent to great numbers of libraries, Y.M.C.A. societies, 
universities ... and newspapers. 1 
It is readily apparent, from what Sir Gilbert Parker 
had to say about his responsibilities, that the British 
propaganda activites in the United States were great in 
quantity and highly diversified in their approach. However, 
true to Viereck's definition, little was known or said about 
1 
Sir Gilbert Parker, "The United States and the War," 
Harper'~Magazine, CXXXVI (March, 1918), 522. 
8
 
the activities of Wellington House before the U. S. involve-
menta As one author has said in regard to Wellington House, 
"all public mention of it was sedulously avoided • . 
Even the most direct interpellations in the House of Commons 
. . . were met by dextrous evasions or by forthright refusal 
1 
to explain." Yet, despite this cloak of secrecy surround­
ing the activities of Wellington House, it is still possible 
to make some generalizations about the overall British 
propaganda techniques as they were applied against American 
neutrality. 
One of the outstanding characteristics of the British 
propaganda war was that different approaches were used in an 
effort to enlist the support of the various segments of 
American society. The broad body of intellectuals and other 
influential men in American socity was one of the key targets 
of the propaganda campaign. As is indicated in Parker's 
statement, one of the most important methods used in the 
effort to gain the support of this segment of American 
1 
Squires, QQ. cit., p. 29. 
9
 
society was the use of personal contact. It has been said 
that the mailing list of Wellington House eventually con­
tained the names of 260,000 influential persons throughout 
the United States, and that this list, which Parker compiled 
after studying the American Who'~ Who, was divided into 
groupings according to profession, intelligence, and community 
1 
standing. The quantities of this type of correspondence 
were, according to Parker, "immense." 
The propagandists of Great Britain also attempted to 
gain the support of the intellectual and influential Ameri­
cans through a series of speech's, lectures, and private 
conversations. This propaganda approach was clearly evident 
in Grey's letter to Theodore Roosevelt of September 10, 1914, 
when he said: 
J. M. Barrie and A. E. W. Mason, some of whose books 
you have no doubt read, are going to the United States. 
Their objective is . . . not to make speeches or give 
lectures, but to meet people, particularly those con­
nected with Universities, and explain the British case 2 
as regards this war and our views of the issues involved. 
1 
Horace Cornelius Peterson, Propaganda for War; the 
Campaign against American Neutrality 1914-1917 (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1939), p. 16. 
2Grey, Ope cit., p. 143. 
10 
This approach was again evident in the letter of Spring Rice, 
the British Ambassador to Washington, to Lord Newton, dated 
October 21, 1914, in which he stated, " Two labour 
members are over here now and are doing a good deal of use­
1 
ful talking in the private line--none public." 
The propaganda appeal to the educated and influential 
men of American society was also evident in the names of some 
of the men who wrote for Wellington House. Perhaps the most 
outstanding individual among this group was Lord Bryce, the 
2 
former British Ambassador to the United States. Bryce had 
been a very popular Ambassador, and was well known to the 
intellectual community. In fact, Grey has said in this 
regard that, "at Washington the personal position of Mr. Bryce 
was less that of an Ambassador than of a distinguished man 
3 
of letters. 1I The propaganda writings of such a distinguished 
man as Lord Bryce would of course have a certain impact upon 
the intellectuals in American society. 
lstephen Gwynn (Ed.), The Letters and Friendships of 
Sir Cecil Spring Rice (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1929), 
II, 239. 
2Bryce served in this post from 1907 to 1913. 
3Grey, 9p. cit., p. 89. 
11 
While the intellectuals and other influential men in 
America were of great importance to the British propagandists, 
they were by no means the only group toward which the propa­
ganda effort was aimed. A second key target of the campaign 
was naturally the American politician. 
One of the main thrusts of this propaganda appeal was 
of course aimed at the top of the American political struc­
ture, the White House. Colonel House apparently served as 
one of the routes by which the British propaganda penetrated 
into the White House. Peterson has said in this regard, 
"European statesmen believed the Colonel to be influential 
with Mr. Wilson ... and so they courted him and praised 
1 
his astuteness and the wisdom of his words." This view of 
the role of Colonel House to the propagandists is in part 
supported by a letter from Grey to Spring Rice dated 
January 22, 1915, in which he said: 
. . . it is well that he [House] should be informed 
as to the state of public opinion here . . . . What is 
felt here is that while Germany deliberately planned a 
war of pure aggression, has occupied and devastated 
1 8Peterson, op. cit., p. 1 2. 
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large districts . . . the only act on the part of the 
United States is a protest ....1 
The propagandists also found that Walter Hines Page, 
the United States Ambassador in London, could serve to carry 
their opinion into the White House. In fact, they found 
Page to be almost as sYmpathetic to the British cause as 
2 
were the British themselves. The work of the British propa­
gandists can clearly be seen in Page's letter to his son, 
Arthur, dated November 6, 1914, in which he stated, "the 
extent to which the German people have permitted themselves 
to be fooled is beyond belief. As a little instance of it, 
3 
I enclose a letter that Lord Bryce gave me . . " While 
it is true that the letter may have been given to Page as an 
interest item, it should not be forgotten that Lord Bryce 
was one of the leading writers for the British propaganda 
1Char1es Seymour, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1926), I, 347. 
Zpeterson, ££. cit., p. 185-6. 
3Burton J. Hendrick, The Life ang Letters of Walter H. 
Page (Garden City: Garden City Publishing Co., 1927), II, 345. 
Underlining not in the original. The letter itself stated 
that Germany was bound to win the war, and when it had, it 
would destroy all cities even remotely connected with the 
production of war materials. The letter also stated that 
within a year Germany would seize the new canal and proclaim 
its' definance of the Monroe Doctrine. And concluded by saying 
that as a nation Anlericans were cowardly and would never fight. 
13
 
campaign. Thus, the letter may well have been given with 
the intention of influencing Page's attitude toward the 
war, and also in the hope that Page might forward it to 
Wilson, as indeed he did. 
The American Ambassador wrote many letters to people 
other than his son. Many of these letters went directly to 
the President. Of these letters to Wilson, it has been 
said that: 
Page's early letters had furnished the President 
ideas which had taken shape in Wilson's policies, 
and disagreeable as the communications now became, 
there are evidences that they influenced the . . . 
White House, and that they had much to do in finally 
forcing Mr. Wilson into the war. l 
It should, however, also be noted that this opinion of the 
effectiveness of Page's letters to Wilson is open to some 
debate. In fact, Peterson has said that, " Wilson 
deliberately ignored some of the reports of Ambassador 
2 
Page . . . . It is nonetheless significant that Page
" 
was apparently completely won over to the English cause. It 
was significant because Page was one of the President's 
1 
Ibid., pp. 23-4. 
2 
Peterson, 2£. cit" p. 187. 
------ --
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primary sources of information concerning the state of 
affairs in Europe. 
The propaganda appeal to the American politician was 
also aimed at politicians outside of the Administration. 
Among these Theodore Roosevelt was perhaps one of the most 
outstanding. It has already been observed that Roosevelt 
and Grey were in direct communication, and an extract from 
Grey's letter to Roosevelt of October 20, 1914, showed 
them to be in complete agreement: 
Your idea, that the United States might have come 
forward on the eve of the outbreak of the war to up­
hold Treaty rights, makes me glow at the thought of 
what might have been achieved. 1 
It must, however, also be noted that not all of the 
American politicians were as completely won over to the 
British cause as Roosevelt and Page. Senator Stone of 
Missouri was one example of this when he charged on 
January 8, 1915, that the United States was pursuing a 
2 
policy which favored Great Britain as opposed to Germany. 
1 
Grey, £Q. cit., 145. 
2 
"Official Correspondence Relating to the Censorship 
of Telegrams Transmitted by Cable and Wireless," American 
Journal of International Law, IX (July, 1915), special 
supplement, pp. 253-4. 
15 
Bryan is still another example of the American politician 
who did not fall victim to the propagandists' appeal. 
After his resignation as Secretary of State on June 7, 1915, 
Bryan toured the nation speaking for peace and against 
American involvement. These examples clearly illustrate 
that while the British propaganda appeal found some success 
among the American politicians, it was not universally 
successful. 
The British propaganda appeal was also aimed at a 
third key segment of American society--the man on the street. 
As the statement by Sir Gilbert Parker (page 6) makes clear, 
the appeal to the average man was of great importance to 
the success of the propaganda effort. To reach the average 
man the propagandists used any of the following as their 
more important techniques: (1) newspapers, (2) cinema, 
(3) interviews, (4) articles, (5) pamphlets, (6) letters, 
1 
and (7) strategically placed documents. 
As this was a period before the rise of such mass 
1
 
Parker, op. cit., p. 522.
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media as radio and television, the newspaper was perhaps 
the most important medium through which the propagandists 
could reach the man on the street. The great importance of 
the newspaper to the propaganda effort would seem to be 
evidenced by Parker's statement that his activities included 
supplying three hundred and sixty smaller American news­
papers with an English paper, and his being in lfconstant 
touch with the permanent correspondents of American news­
1 
papers in England." As will be seen, the British took 
full advantage of their geographic position to give the 
war news in America a distinctly English point of view. 
It can clearly be seen that the British propaganda 
effort was aimed at three large overall groupings of 
American society, but it should also be pointed out that 
in many cases the propaganda appeal was aimed at still 
smaller sub-groupings within the larger general divisions 
of society. Thus, as Peterson pointed out, extensive 
efforts were made in the religious field, especially among 
1 
Idem. 
17 
1 
Episcopalians and Catholics. The great diversity of the 
American society made it necessary for the propagandists 
to employ a great diversity in their techniques to gain the 
support of the majority of the citizens of the United 
States. 
Despite this great diversity in their propaganda 
appeals, it is interesting to note that the propaganda 
techniques used by the British fall neatly in line with 
the basic techniques of propaganda as outlined by Lasswell 
in his study of propaganda and the world war. Lasswell 
listed the following as the "connnon denominator" propaganda 
techniques of the majority of the countries engaged in 
propaganda campaigns: (1) the opposing country was nearly 
always made to appear overbearing and contemptuous, (2) the 
enemy was insolent and sordid, (3) the enemy was perfidious, 
(4) the enemy always conducted a lying propaganda, (5) the 
enemy was always quarrelsome, crude, and destructive, and 
(6) the enemy was cruel and degenerate in his conduct of 
1 
Peterson, ~. cit., p. 28. 
-----
18 
1 
the war. 
The following British propaganda techniques and 
appeals were clearly discernible in their campaign to 
enlist American support: (1) war guilt; it was made to 
appear that Germany alone had started the war, (2) Germany 
was made to appear to have reprehensible ambitions, (3) it 
was made to appear that Great Britain would win the war, 
(4) damnation, the enemy was made to appear as militaristic 
villains, (5) compassion, and effort was made to arouse 
the sympathy of the United States, (6) an effort was made 
to make it appear as though the United States and Great 
Britain shared identical interests in the war, and (7) an 
effort was made to make it appear that the enemy was guilty 
2 
of war crimes. The great similarity between this list of 
basic British propaganda techniques and Lasswell's "con:n:non 
denominator" techniques is readily apparent. 
Of the basic propaganda techniques used by Great 
Britain several require no further con:n:nent, but at least 
1 
Harold D. Lasswell, Propaganda Techniques in the War
(New York: Alfred A. Knoff, 1927), pp. 77-81. 
2 
Peterson, gp. cit., pp. 35-64. 
19 
three of these techniques were of such great importance to 
the total propaganda effort that they merit further consi­
deration. 
It has been said that, "when the public believes that 
the enemy began the war and blocks a permanent . . . peace, 
1 
the propagandist has achieved his purpose." The point of 
statement was, of course, not overlooked by the British 
propaganda organization. It became one of the major efforts 
of the British propagandists to make it appear as though 
Germany alone was responsible for the war. This effort 
was aimed at all segments of American society from Wilson 
and House to the most obscure farmer in the middle-west. 
It has already been noted on January 22, 1915, Grey informed 
his Ambassador in Washington that House should be informed 
that, " ... Germany has deliberately planned a war of 
2 
pure aggression." And, it can be assumed that the British 
newspapers which Sir Gilbert Parker supplied to three 
hundred and sixty newspapers in smaller American cities 
1 
Ibid., p. 77. 
2 
Seymour, Vol. I, loco cit. 
20
 
also contained these charges of German "war guilt." 
One of the best examples of British "war guilt" pro­
paganda is to be found in Lord Bryce's introduction to The 
War of Democracy: The Allies Statement, in which he wrote: 
So far as Britain was concerned, it was the in­
vasion of Belgium that ended all efforts to avert 
war, and made the friends of peace themselves join 
in holding that the duty of fulfilling their treaty 
obligations to a weak State was paramount to every 
other consideration. 1 
The reader of this statement was clearly led to believe 
that Great Britain entered the war for only the noblest 
of reasons--the German invasion of Belgium. 
Apparently, to a great extent, the "war guilt" pro­
paganda was successful. As one student of the period has 
pointed out, "the Central Powers maneuvered themselves into 
the uncomfortable posture of apologists, leaving the Allies 
2 
the easier task of attack on moral grounds." The war 
1 
The War of Democracy: The Allies Statement (Garden 
City, New York: -noub1eday, Page, and Company, 1917), p. 24; 
also to be found in: Viscount James Bryce, "Teachings of 
General von Bernhardi," New York Times Current History, the 
European War, (New York: The New York Times Company, 1915), 
I, 344. 
2Frederic Logan Paxson, American Democracy and the 
World War, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1936), I, 166. 
21 
,,',,--­
guilt clause of the Treaty of Versailles gives ample 
testimony to the success of the propagandists. 
A second of the British propaganda techniques worthy 
of special note is that of "identity of interest." It was 
intended that this approach would make the people in the 
United States feel that the British were fighting "our 
fight." Peterson has said of this aspect of the British 
propaganda campaign: 
Every possible effort was made to make Americans 
feel that the war was 'our fight.' Every possible 
point of similarity between the two countries was 
stressed and re-stressed . . . . A vital part of 
these arguments was the contention that Great Britain 
and the United States were sister democracies. l 
An excellent example of the British "identity of 
interest" propaganda is to be found in Lord Bryce's intro­
duction to The War of Democracy, in which he stated: 
This is a war of Principles, moral) and political, 
in which every man in neutral countries who has a 
sense of his personal duties to humanity ought to try 
to find the truth . . . so that the sentiment of his 
country would cast its weight on the side of truth 
and humanity.2 
1 
Peterson) £R. cit.) p. 35. 
2 
"The War of Democracy)" £R. cit.) p. xi. 
22 
Even the title,of this book, The War of Democracy, indi­
cated that the struggle was "our fight," for was the United 
States not a sister democracy. 
Unlike the "war guilt" propaganda, the "identity of 
interest" propaganda has no clause in the peace treaty 
attesting to its success. It is, however, of some signi­
ficance that the United States did eventually enter the 
war on the side of the "democracies" against Germany and 
her allies. It cannot be said that the British Ilidentity 
of interest" propaganda was alone responsible for this 
course of events, but it should at least be noted that a 
great propaganda effort was made to achieve just such a 
result. 
The final propaganda technique to be given further 
consideration is that of war crimes said to have been 
committed by the enemy soldiers. William McAdoo, the 
President's son-in-law and a member of the Cabinet, wrote 
of this propaganda technique: 
The main idea was to create an impression that 
the Germans were barbarians, and the picture was 
built up carefully . . . . The British agents 
managed to make a large part of the American people 
23 
believe that German soldiers had cut off the hands 
of Belgian children. l 
As Secretary McAdoo has suggested, many Americans 
came to believe that the atrocity stories were true and 
almost beyond dispute. No less a person than the American 
Ambassador to London expressed belief in the atrocity 
reports when he wrote to Wilson on September 11, 1914: 
Accounts of atrocities are so much a part of war 
that for some time I did not believe the unbelievable 
reports that were sent from Europe . . . . But Ameri­
can and other neutral observers who have seen these 
things in France and especially in Belgium now convince 
me that the Germans have perpetrated some of the most 
barbarous deeds in history . . . . 2 
Perhaps the most outstanding use of the atrocity story 
as a propaganda technique was found in the famous Bryce 
Report. It has been said by a number of students of the 
period that by using the respectable name of Lord Bryce 
on the atrocity report it "put scepticism out of question 
3 
II Words like the following, when spoken by such 
1 
Squires, £E. cit., p. 67. 
2 
Hendrick, Q£. cit., p. 325-6. 
3 
Peterson, Q£. cit., p. 58. One of a number of such 
statements. 
24 
~---'.: 
an eminent person as Lord Bryce could well have convinced 
millions that the Germans were indeed barbarians: 
All along the line of their march innocent civil­
ians, old men, women, and children as well as other 
inhabitants were slaughtered on the pretext that 
some persons in the towns and villages had shot at 
the invading force . . . . 
Shocking outrages were committed upon women, and 
that by officers as well as soldiers, and little 
effort was made to restrain or punish such crimes, 
which were often committed under the influence of 
liquor. I 
Indeed, some measure of the success of this type propaganda 
is to be found in the tremendous response and outpouring of 
aid that the Americans gave to the people of Belgium through 
the Committee for Relief in Belgium. 
However, before dismissing the question of atrocity 
stories as a propaganda technique, something should be said 
with regard to the validity of the various charges made. 
First, as Page has pointed out, atrocity stories are, perhaps 
with some justification, a normal product of war. Secondly, 
the description of drunken German soldiers and officers as 
given by Lord Bryce hardly coincides with the stern 
I 
" ."The War of Democracy, .22.. c~t., p. xv. 
» 
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discipline which is presumably necessary to move such a 
large army so far and so fast while at war. And, finally 
it should also be pointed out that many of the atrocity 
stories were never actually proven to be true. In fact, 
there is evidence to indicate, that many of these stories 
were simply not true. As one student of the period has 
reported: 
A group of dependable journalists, caught in 
Germany by the war, Rodger Lewis, Irving S. Cobb, 
Harry Hansen, James O'donnell Bennett, and John 
McCutchen, united September 3 "in declaring German 
atrocities groundless as far as we are able to 
observe." Subsequent attempts to establish them 
. have in general failed ....1 
Perhaps the words which Peterson used to summarize his 
feelings about the Bryce Report can also be applied to 
the accuracy of the atrocity reports, "It was in itself 
2 
one of the worst atrocities of the war." 
This then is a general overview of the total British 
propaganda effort in the United States in the years from 
1914 to 1917. However, the question still reID~ins as to 
1 
Paxson, £E. cit., p. 168. 
2 
Peterson, op. cit., p. 58. 
26 
why the British were for the most part successful in their 
propaganda effort. 
Some of the possible reasons for the success of Great 
Britain are: (1) there was a pro-British attitude among 
many leading Americans, (2) the British propaganda was 
unobtrusive and artistically presented, and (3) the British 
control over the conventional channels of American communi­
cation and public opinion made it unnecessary for them to 
1 
compete on an equal footing with the German propagandists. 
The latter is of particular importance to this study. 
It has been said that, "News is the most important tool of 
2 
the propagandists." To gain complete control over the 
information which filtered into America from the war zone, 
the British established a most comprehensive system of news 
control and censorship. 
It is to that system of news control and censorship 
that this study now turns in an effort to examine its' 
function and its' results. 
1
 
Ibid., p. 33.
 
2
 
Martin, £E. cit., p. 17.
 
CHAPTER II 
THE IMPLEMENTATION, ORGANIZATION, AND 
PROPAGANDA OBJECTIVES OF CENSORSHIP AND NEWS CONTROL 
One of the more interesting facets of the British 
use of censorship and news control as a method of propa­
ganda was that the groundwork for this effort was made 
even before the war had errupted. The Press Censorship 
Comrrdttee, made up of representatives of the War Office, 
the Admiralty, and the press, was formed sometime in 1913 
for the express purpose of supervising a voluntary agree­
ment with the press for the withholding of information whose 
1 
publication would be undesirable to the national interest. 
It is also interesting to note that Rear-Admiral 
Sir Douglas Brownrigg was asked in the spring of 1914 to 
accept an appointment as Chief Naval Censor of Radio-Tele­
2 
graphy in the event of mobilization. In this capacity he 
placed the censorship apparatus into motion on August 1, 1914, 
1 
N. B. Dearle, Dictionary of Official War-Time Organi­
zations (London: Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press, 
1928), p. 310. 
2 
Rear-Admiral Sir Douglas Brownrigg, Bt., Indiscre­
tions of the Naval Censor (New York: George H. Doran Company, 
1920), p. 16. 
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when it was announced that Great Britain was placing wire­
less telegraphy under "such rules as may be made by the 
1 
Admiralty." At approximately the same time an organiza­
tion was established under the leadership of Sir Alfred 
Ewing for the study of German wireless messages when taken 
2 
in. " 
The British efforts to establish control over the 
use of wireless was greatly aided by the actions of the 
United States. This aid came first on August 5, 1914, when 
President Wilson issued an executive order prohibiting the 
unneutra1 use of any wireless stations located on United 
3 
States territory. This was followed on September 5, 1914, 
by an executive order in which the United States assumed 
direct control over those radio stations in the United 
States that were capable of communicating with Europe. 
This executive order also forbade the use of any code or 
1 
British and Foreign State Papers, 1914 (London: 
His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1917) CVII, 65. 
2 
Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis (New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1932), p. 503. 
3 
American Journal of International Law, op. cit., 
p. 115. 
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1 
or cipher in messages sent by this wireless system. 
Wireless had remained as the only rapid means of 
German communication with the United States after the 
British cut the German trans-Atlantic cables. Thus, when 
the United States seized the German wireless stations at 
Tuckerton, New Jersey, and at Sayville, Long Island, while 
taking no similar action against British cables, they greatly 
aided the British censorship and news control efforts. 
Indeed, when there was much criticism of Wilson in England 
for his opposition to the British contraband list, Spring 
Rice was found to have defended Wilson on the basis of the 
position he had taken toward the German wireless stations. 
As Spring Rice said, " . . . he stopped the use by the 
Germans of their wireless installations . and this is 
2 
enough. II 
Censorship did not, of course, end with the wireless. 
For, the German trans-Atlantic cables were cut as Great 
Britain entered the war, and several weeks later the Liberial­
1 
Ibid., p. 116. 
2 
Letters and Friendships ofStephen Gwynn (Ed.), The 
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1929),Sir Cecil Spring Rice, (Boston: 
II, 243-4. 
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Brazil cable was also cut. The later had served as an 
alternative route for German cables bound for America 
after the German owned trans-Atlantic cables had been cut. 
However, when this cable route was also cut, the only sub­
marine cables left in operation connecting Europe and the 
United States were those of the Allies--mostly Great 
1 
Britain's. It was, therefore, a relatively simple task 
for England to impose censorship over most of the cable 
messages passing between Europe and the United States. 
This censorship was established early in the war 
when Great Britain gave notice through the International 
Bureau at Berne to the effect that Great Britain was 
suspending the transmission of telegrams and radiograms 
2 
through its' territories. It was added, however, that 
England would allow the transmission of those messages 
1 
Tuchman, 2£. cit., p. 11. Apparently one French 
cable remained in operation at least part of the time, and 
a cable also came to the United States from Siveria, but 
this route was apparently much too expensive for normal use. 
2 
Papers Relatin~ to the Foreign Relat~ons of th~ 
United States 1915 Special Supplement (Washlngton: Unlted 
States Gover~ent Printing Office, 1927), p. 707. (Herein­
after referred to as FRUS) 
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sent by the various governments and private citizens, 
provided that the messages be in plain language, either 
English or French, and also on the understanding that they 
would be received only at the senders' risk and that they 
1 
would be subject to censorship. 
The power to impose this censorship was granted through 
an order in council on August 8, 1914, and later by the 
2 
Defense of the Realm Consolidation Act of November 28, 1914. 
This act stated in part that no person shall "make false 
statements likely to ••• prejudice his majesty's relations 
3 
with foreign powers," and, in order to enforce this law, 
the power of search and seizuere was given to the "competent 
4 
naval or military authority." Armed with this sweeping 
power the government was free to establish a comprehensive 
and elaborate censorship and news control system. 
Shortly after August 4, 1914, the Press Bureau (Press 
Censorship) was founded by the government to replace the 
1
 
Idem.
 
2
 
British State Papers, QE. cit. p. 19.
 
3
 
Aggs, QQ. cit., p. 465-6.
 
4 
Ibid., p. 469. 
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pre-war Press Censorship Committee. It was the duty of the 
Press Bureau, taking orders from both the War Office and the 
Admiralty, to supervise the issuing of news to and by the 
press, and to prevent information of value from falling 
1 
into enemy hands. The exact date upon which this all 
important news control and censoring body began operations 
is not clear, but Rear-Admiral Brownrigg has stated that 
he was asked to represent the Admiralty on this body the 
night of August 5, 1914, less than twenty-four hours after 
2 
England had entered the war. It can be seen that the 
British wasted no time in establishing control over the 
war news, including that bound for the United States. 
Press censorship did not end with the Press Bureau, 
for a second press censorship body also came into opera­
tion soon after England entered the war. This press cen­
sorship department was formed by the Home Office to censor 
3 
that part of the news not censored by the military. 
1
 
Dearle, loc. cit.
 
2 
Brownrigg, £R. cito, p. 19.
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In addition to the above mentioned press censors, a 
regular government censoring organization was founded soon 
after the war broke out. It was the object of this body, 
under the direct control of the Army Council, to censor 
private and commercial messages in an effort to prevent 
information of value from reaching the enemy, and also to 
1 
acquire information for British use. Naturally this form 
of censorship covered both the mails and telegrams, either 
by wireless or cable, and applied to all such messages 
that came within the jurisdiction of this body. That 
jurisdiction included all such messages originating in the 
United Kingdom, those messages that were simply passing 
through their territory, and all such messages on board 
vessels which were forced to land in Great Britain for 
search and seizure. 
As was the case with press dispatches, little time 
was wasted in imposing censorship over private and commer­
cial messages. It has already been mentioned that wireless 
1
 
Ib id., p. 298.
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messages were placed under British censorship on August 1, 
1914, even before England had declared war. It is not 
clear as to the exact date at which cable messages were 
first placed under government censorship, but most evidence 
indicates that it was in operation within a few days after 
1 
Great Britain declared war. Censorship of the mails was 
somewhat slower in taking effect. It has been said that 
2 
mail censorship was not imposed until August 29, 1914, 
and then only when pressure from such influential groups 
as the War Office and the Admiralty had overcome the 
opposition of some people within the Government. The 
Government had apparently been reluctant to act in this 
direction because censorship of this type was, according 
to Brownrigg, repugent to many, and also because many 
feared that it would involve England in trouble with the 
3 
neutrals. 
1 
One example of this evidence is to be found in 
Walter Millis's Road to War: America 1914-1917, p. 71. He 
stated that afterthe-ce~n cables were cut, the New York 
Times was not able to print an uncensored report from Berlin 
until one was received by wireless on September 5, 1914. 
2 
Peterson, QR. cit., p. 14.
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Thus, within a month after the war had begun, Great 
Britain had imposed a comprehensive system of news control 
and censorship which was capable of controlling much of the 
information passing between the United States and Europe. 
Three separate organizations were responsible for the 
successful operation of this effort, but the three were not 
totally independent of one another. Brownrigg has pointed 
out that all doubtful matters were referred to experts, and 
at least in the case of the Admiralty, a post captain was 
appointed as naval adviser to the chief censor at the War 
1 
Office. 
At this point the reader may be asking himself what 
all this has to do with the British propaganda effort. The 
answer to this question is simply that, "news is the most 
2 
important tool of the propagandists. f1 Therefore, if the 
ensuing study is to be meaningful, some knowledge of the 
censorship organization and what it was hoped that it would 
1
 
Ibid., p. 24.
 
2 
Martin, loco cit. 
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achieve is essential. It should also be pointed out that 
while the stated objective of the organizations thus far 
described has been for the most part to prevent valuable 
information from reaching the enemy, these organizations 
could equally as well be used to prevent the public, of 
either Great Britain or the United States, from reading 
what news the propagandists considered undesirable. 
In fact, British censorship and news control 
apparatus were frequently used in just such a manner. 
Examples of this use of censorship and news control were 
abundant. One such example took place on the night of 
September 8, 1915, when a Zeppelin raided London, it was 
reported that hardly before the Zeppelin had disappeared 
from sight word came down from the Press Bureau that no 
stories about the raid were even to be submitted to the 
1 
censor, much less published or cabled abroad. The 
Review of Reviews gave a second example of this British 
use of censorship to control what Americans read when it 
1 
G. Shepard, "Forty-Two Centimeter Blue Pencil," 
Everybodyl~, XXXVI (April, 1917), p. 479. 
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reported, H • • • they have censored • 
• • their owno· 
Prime Minister's speeches and those of the Foreign 
Minister on the ground that they would create an unfavor­
1 
able impression abroad." 
Censorship of this type was not intended as a means 
of preventing valuable information from falling into the 
hands of the enemy, but rather it was intended to aid the 
efforts of the British propagandists. As was stated in 
the previous chapter, one of the major British propaganda 
techniques, to enlist the support of the United States, 
was the appeal that England was bound to win the war. 
Since stories like the two examples above would tend to 
raise certain questions as the mrentual outcome of the 
war, it must be assumed that this was the primary factor 
fortneir being suppressed by the British censors. Indeed, 
though the news of the Zeppelin attack on London was 
suppressed by the Press Bureau, that same bureau later 
issued a short, formal statement saying that a Zeppelin 
1 
Oswald Garrison Villard, Hpress as Affected 
Reviet~ oJ .Revielvs, 1.1 ( January, 1915), 81. 
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I 
had "visited the eastern counties." 
Thus, it may be concluded that while it was a 
primary objective of the censorship to prevent useful 
information from reaching the enemy, it was also carried 
out with a considerable amount of attention given to the 
propaganda value of each piece of information read by the 
censor. As one British censor said of his duties: 
And here I sit, because it is wartime, before a 
large table covered with serried rows of letters, 
with instructions to open them all and search therein 
for, first, information likely to be useful to the 
enemy; secondly, anything likely to discourage re­
cruiting; and thirdly false information likely to 
alarm or depress a credulous public. 2 
The duel nature of British censorship was also attested to 
by Rear-Admiral Brownrigg, the Chief Naval Censor of Radio­
telegraphy and the Admiralty representative on the Press 
Bureau, when he wrote: 
It was of the highest national interest during the 
Great War that information which might be useful to 
the enemy should be suppressed . . . and though I 
became involved in propaganda work, which was essen­
tial , I was never unconscious of the point of view 
1 
Shepard, loc. cit. 
2 
"What the Censor Senses," Literary Digest, LIll 
(October 14, 1916), 967. 
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1 
of the officers in command at sea. 
As secrecy was apparently what the naval commanders wanted 
and needed, Brownrigg suppressed important facts while at 
the same time arranging Grand Fleet tours for correspon­
dents of certain newspapers. 
It should also be pointed out that Great Britainrs 
major news control and censorship organization and the 
major propaganda organization were eventually brought 
together, although nearly at the end of the period in 
question, under the leadership of a single department 
head. This was done sometime in February, 1917, when the 
Department of Information was formed to rrprovide a more 
complete organization for the supplying of information on 
the cause of, and necessary organization for the war, and 
to co-ordinate and extend the work of existing departments 
2 
Included in this new organization were the old" 
1 
Brownrigg, ££. cit., p. 103. It might be pointed 
. r •
out that the larger portion 0 f Brownr~gg s memo~rs concerns 
his propaganda activities as opposed to his strictly cen­
sorship activities. 
2 
Dearle, 2£. cit.) p. 128. 
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Press Bureau ~nd Wellington House, the major propaganda 
organization. 
At this point it should be clear that the British 
had established a huge censorship and news control organi­
2 
zation, but there might still be some question as to 
what specifically Great Britain hoped to achieve with this 
organization. 
In an attempt to answer this question, the following 
general goals can be attributed to the British censorship 
and news control campaign: (1) it was hoped that the 
censorship would keep valuable information from reaching 
the enemy, (2) it was hoped that strict British censorship 
would stop much of the enemies communication with the 
outside world, (3) it was hoped that the censorship would 
contribute to the disruption of the enemies' world trade, 
(4) it was an aim of the censorship to hide the extent of 
1 
Peterson, ~. cit., pp. 229-30. 
2 
In early 1917 there were said to be thirty-seven 
hundred people in London alone censoring the mails. 
Peterson, ~. cit., p. 14. 
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the German victories, (5) it was hoped that the censorship 
would be of use in obtaining useful information , and 
(6) it was also hoped that through censorship and news 
control Great Britain would be able to exert control over 
much of the news that went to neutral countries. 
It is evident from this list of censorship goals 
and from the preceding discussion that censorship was not 
imposed for either strictly military or for strictly propa­
ganda reasonso Rather, it was for a combination of reasons 
that Great Britain resorted to a strict system of censor­
ship and news control. 
Such censorship goals as preventing valuable infor­
mation from falling into enemy hands were primarily based 
upon military need, and as such they will not be given 
much consideration in the remainder of this study. However, 
in the final analysis of the merits of the British censor­
ship and news control effort, it must not be forgotten 
that these additional reasons for the censorship did exist 
and were of great importance to the total military effort. 
It is to those censorship goals that were either in 
part or in whole motivated for reasons of propaganda that 
42 
this study now turns. This will be done in an effort to 
evaluate the extent to which the British were successful 
in achieving these censorship and news control goals. 
CHAPTER III
 
-

THE SUCCESSES OF CENSORSHIP AND NEWS
 
CONTROL AS A METHOD OF PROPAGANDA
 
What success the British propagandists were able to 
achieve through the use of censorship and news control were 
based to a great extent upon the events in this area during 
the first months of the war. For, as described in the pre­
vious chapter, the groundwork for the British censorship 
and news control apparatus was established in the first 
months of the conflict. 
The events in this area during the first month of 
the war also contributed greatly to the British objective 
of depriving the enemy of as much outside communication 
as was possible. It was of great importance to the British 
that the enemy be without outside communication for both 
military and propaganda reasons. The military reasons 
for depriving the enemy of his means of communication are 
outside of the scope of this thesis, but it might at least 
be well to note that one of the first Allied complaints to 
the United States concerned the military use of German 
wireless stations located in the United States. It was 
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contended that these stations were being used to direct 
1 
German ships at sea. As was noted in the previous 
chapter, the United States responded punctually to these 
charges and seized the German wireless stations. 
This event, coupled with the British cutting of the 
German trans-Atlantic cables and later the British censor­
ship of the mails, meant in effect that Great Britain 
could exert considerable control over the German communi­
cations with the United States. 
This British control over German communications with 
the United States was, of course, not complete control. 
German messages were still allowed to pass over the wireless 
route, provided that a copy of the German code was on file 
2 
with the American Government. And, according to Tuchman, 
even this restriction could be circumvented by sending 
German Government communiques in secret code in messages 
3 
ostensibly signed by German commercial firms. However, 
1 
Ray Stannard Baker, The Public Papers of Woodrow 
Wilson (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1925), V, 275. 
2 
Tuchman, QR. cit., p. 101. 
3 
Idem. 
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even with these loopholes, wireless did not provide 
Germany and her allies with as much communication with 
the United States as was needed. Indeed, Peterson has 
stated that it was not until late 1915 that the Central 
Powers were able to send material of propaganda value 
1 
by wireless. This view of the limited value of wireless 
is supported by J. C. Willever, of Western Union, who 
wrote to Lansing in June of 1915, that it was impractical 
for American business firms to use the wireless system 
because of the higher tolls by wireless ($.62 per word 
by wireless as opposed to $.25 per word by cable), and 
also because the wireless system was not really adequate 
2 
for German and Austro-Hungarian messages alone. He 
added that at that time the Tuckerton station was about 
three days behind in the transmission of what messages 
3 
Western Union was then turning over to it. 
A second possible method of German communication 
1
 
Peterson, OQ. cit., p. 135.
 
2 
FRUS, 1915 Supplement, QE. cit., p. 717. 
3 
Idem. 
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with the United States was through the mails. The British 
had, of course, imposed censorship over this means of 
communication within a month after the outbreak of the 
war. However, as this censorship covered only that mail 
that either originated in British territory or entered 
British jurisdiction by landing at any of her various ports, 
the possible loopholes by this means of communication were 
immense. Yet, judging by the number of American complaints 
1 
to Great Britain over her seizure of American mails, it is 
clear that the British greatly reduced the effectiveness 
of even this method of German communication with the United 
States. It might also be noted that as compared to the 
speed at which messages could be sent by cable and wire­
less, the mails were a very inferior means of communica­
tion. 
About the only remaining methods of German-American 
communications were through the so-called "Swedish round­
about" or by private carriage. It has been stated that 
1 
FRUS from the years 1914 to 1916 contain numerous 
example of such complaints. These complaints ranged from 
the seizure of a few to many hundreds of bags of mail. 
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Germany was able to send some code messages to America with 
the aid of the Swedish Government who passed these messages 
1 
through their own dip10mat;c channels. S h ~	 uc messages sent 
2 
to the United States normally went via Buenos Aires, and 
it usually required a week for them to reach their desti­
3 
nation. Due to its very nature, this method of direct 
communication with the United States was available to 
relatively few messages from the Central Powers. 
Communication by private carriage was also a possible 
means of German communication with America, but, like the 
mails, this system lacked the speed which is so much a part 
of modern war. And, as will be seen later, at least on 
one occasion the British propagandists were able to make 
considerable profit from information seized when the 
Central Powers attempted to use private carriage. 
It might also be well to point out that the German 
Government was allowed to send some messages directly over 
1 
Tuchman, Ope cit., p. 103. Also, Samuel R. Spencer, 
Jr., Decision for War, 1917 (Rindge, New Hampshire: Richard 
R.	 Smith Publisher, Inc., 1953), pp. 58-9. 
2 
Tuchman, 2£. cit., p. 103. 
3
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1 
the State Department cable. Th' "1 ~s pr~v~ ege was arranged 
by Colonel House and authorized by Wilson in the summer of 
2 
1915 during the Lusitania crisis. Again, however, this 
communication route was available to only a relatively few 
German messages. 
At this point it should be apparent that the British 
were not completely successful in their effort to stop all 
German communication with the outside world, but it should 
also be apparent that the British were able to greatly 
reduce the extent to which Germany and Austria were able 
to carryon normal communication with the outside world, 
particularly the United States. 
Even a partial success in depriving the enemy of 
communication with the outside world was of great benefit 
to the British. One of the immediate advantages of 
depriving Germany of her communication with the outside 
world was that it aided the British blockade in disrupting 
German foreign trade. For, as Brownrigg has said in regard 
1 
Ibid. Also, Spencer, .QQ.. cit., p. 59. 
2 132,Tuchman, .QQ.. cit" p, 
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to the censorship: 
I much doubt if any more powerful weapon in 
enforcing the blockade and ruining the enemy's 
overseas trade ever existed, and I am confident 
that no office set up for war purpose was more 
efficiently or quietly run than the postal censor­
ship.l 
The British were so successful in this effort that Page 
wrote to Bryan on January 20, 1915, that most of the 
cables stopped by the British were stopped to prevent 
trading with the enemy, and he continued, Iltelegraphing 
to Germany or to neutral countries which promote trade 
with Germany must therefore be done by some other means 
2 
than British cables if there be any other." And, Harris, 
the American Consul at Stockholm, notified Lansing on 
September 8, 1915, that arrangements had finally been 
made so that wireless messages from Stockholm to America 
could be sent by wireless via Nauen, Germany. liThe object 
is to become emancipated as far as possible from the 
English telegraph system whose censors worry and harass 
Swedish business men to such an extent that it is almost 
1 
Brownrigg, ~. cit., pp. 199-200. 
2 
FRUS, 1915 Supplement, QR. cit., p. 701. 
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1 
impossib le to do business at all. tI 
Censorship may have also somewhat hampered the 
official communication of the Central Powers with their 
representatives in the United States. For, it was no 
longer possible for such communications by cable, and, 
at least until the summer of 1915, such communications 
could not be sent in code unless a copy of that code was 
on file with the American Government. And, as the British 
navy ruled the seas, apparently communication by diplomatic 
courier was also hampered because of possible British 
capture. Thus, the diplomats of the Central Powers turned 
to such alternative means of communication as private 
carriage and the so-called "Swedish Roundabout." 
However, of even greater handicap to the German 
propagandists was the fact that their news was censored 
2 
by their enemy. This was a great handicap to the German 
propagandists because they were not able to receive an 
1 
Ibid., p. 725.
 
2
 
Peterson, Q£. cit., p. 135.
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adequate supply of information from abroad. As Peterson 
stated, "Dernberg [the leading German propagandist] did 
not know what the American government was doing, what the 
British government planned to do, or what his own govern­
1 
ment was considering." It might also be noted that war 
news from Germany was difficult to obtain in America. As 
one magazine reported: 
. . . no German publications of any sort are 
allowed to go through England to the United States. 
Tons of such publications--newspapers, periodicals, 
books, pamphlets--confiscated in transit, are 
stacked in the Censor's office in London. 2 
This lack of communication on the part of the German 
propagandists, coupled with the fact that most German propa­
ganda was apparently not framed in a manner that appealed to 
most Americans, explains to a great extent why the German 
propaganda failed to gain much support in America. 
A second key manner in which the British propagandists 
were successfully able to use censorship and news control was 
1 
Ibid., p. 137. 
2 
"Government Control of the Press," Nation, CV 
September 13, 1917), 288. 
S2
 
in their effort to hide German victories. As was stated in 
the first chapter, one of the major British propaganda tech­
niques was to make it appear as though the Allied cause was 
bound to be successful. Therefore, with the initial German 
victories and the later stalemate in the conflict, it became 
necessary for the British to hide the German military successes. 
The extent to which the British censors were able to 
hide German military victories was testified to by Page when 
he wrote to Wilson on August 9, 1914, that he really did not 
1 
know what was happening, "so strict is the censorship." 
And, Page wrote to his son, Arthur, on November 6, 1914, that 
he had known for a week of the blowing up of a British dread-
naught, yet, he related to his son, nothing had appeared in 
2 
the press about it. One possible explanation for the suppres­
sion of this and other similar stories was given by Brownrigg 
when he characterized Winston Churchill, the First Lord of 
the Admiralty, as "a bit of a gambler--Le., he would hold onto 
a bit of bad news for a time on the chance of getting a bit of 
1 
Hendrick, ~.fit., II, 310. 
2 
Ibid., p. 344. 
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1 
good news to publish as an offset . . . . II 
One of the most outstanding examples of this use of 
censorship occurred when the Battleship Audacious was sunk 
by a mine on October 27, 1914. The news of this sinking was 
not made public until after the armistice was signed four 
2 
years later. In fact, Brownrigg has stated that a certain 
New York paper ran a picture of the Audacious along with a 
story describing the work that had been done on her while in 
3 
dock, when in reality it had already been destroyed. 
The readers of Harper'~ Weekly were warned to be aware 
of this type of news control when they read on November 28, 
1914: 
Beware ... of vagueness in official reports. A 
grain of detail is usually more important than a ton 
of generality in any official report. If you read that 
"the Germans have advanced somewhat at B_._; our forces 
have made good progress elsewhere,ff you may assume that 
the German advance was more important than the Allies' 
progress. 4 
1
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The extent to which the British were able to suppress 
German military successes, as well as Allied weaknesses, was 
very great indeed. As one student of the period has stated, 
"perhaps only a handful of soldiers, politicians, and diplo­
matists in the warring governments really know how desperate 
1 
was the Allies situation." It might, however, be added that 
at least some of the leading American politicians and bankers 
must have had some indication of how desperate the Allied 
situation was when the question of a much needed loan came up 
in 1915. At the outbreak of the war it had not been necessary 
for the Allies to borrow money with which to make purchases 
in the United States. But, as these funds were used up, it 
became apparent that if these huge purchases of war materials 
2 
were to continue, a loan would be necessary. Naturally the 
loss of this huge volume of trade would have been disasterous 
for the American economy, but it can also be assumed that the 
loss of this huge source of supply would have been equally 
1 
Walter Millis, Road to War: America 1914-1917 (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1935), p. 371. 
2 
Thomas A. Bailey, Diplomatic History of the American 
People (New York: F. S. Crofts and Co., 1946), p. 622. 
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disasterous to the British military effort. This point
 
could not have escaped the attention of the American politi­
cians and bankers. 
The British propagandists were also able to use the 
censorship as a valuable s~urce of information. It has been 
said that the British censor summarized all of the information 
thus obtained and sent his reports to the departments which 
2 
might be interested in the particular intelligence. It will 
later be seen that this practice worked to the disadvantage 
of the British in certain cases. However, at least in some 
cases, the information obtained by the British censorship 
and British intelligence was used by the British propagan­
dists to achieve great propaganda victories. Peterson has 
stated that in order to fully exploit the information obtained 
1 
The Statistical History of the United States from 
Colonial Times to the Present (Stamford, Conn.: Fairfield 
Publishers, Inc~ Revised Ed., 1965), p. 552. The volume 
of trade between Great Britain and the United States in 1915 
amounted to $912,000,000 as compared to only $29,000,000 worth 
of American trade with Germany in that same year. 
2 
Peterson, QR. cit., p. 15. 
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by the censorship, Captain Guy Gaunt made arrangements where­
by John R. Tathom of the Providence (Rhode Island) Journal 
1 
would give the British disclosures the widest publicity. 
One example of this use of censorship occurred on 
September 1, 1915, when the British removed James J. Archi­
2 
bald from a ship that was being searched at Falmouth. Archi­
bald was found to be carrying papers from Dr. Durnba, the 
Austrian Ambassador to the United States, to his government. 
Included among these was a plan proposed by Dumba to induce 
Hungarians working in munitions plants in the United States 
3 
to go on strike. Also included among the documents seized 
from Archibald was a letter from von Papen , the German Military 
Attache in the United States, to his wife. In this letter he 
remarked, " ... How splendid on the Eastern Front~ I always 
say to these idiotic Yankees that they should shut their 
mouths and better still be full of admiration for all that 
1 
Ibid., p. 153. 
2 
Captain Henry Landau, The Enemy Within (New York: 
G.	 P. Putman's Sons, 1937), p. 52. 
3 
Robert Lansing, War Memoirs of Robert Lansing (Indiana­
polis: The Bobs-Merrill Company, 1935), pp. 63-4. 
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heroism. If Copies of these documents were promptly turned 
over to the Government of the United States, and, in the words 
of Landau, "motivated by a fine unse1fishness,u the British 
2 
also released the text of the documents to the press. 
The result was, of course, a great propaganda victory 
for the British. As was expected, the incident kindled much 
resentment in the United States for the Central Powers. In 
the words of Secretary of State Lansing, U • • • the incident 
aroused much criticism of Doctor Dumba in the press of this 
3 
country." 
A second example of the way in which the British were 
able to gain propaganda victories from information obtained 
through the censorship was in the case of the now famous 
Zimmermann telegram. This message was intercepted by the 
4 
British on January 17, 1917. The telegram, to the German 
Ambassador in Mexico, announced that Germany was about to 
resume unrestricted submarine warfare, and it ordered him 
1
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to make an offer of an alliance with Mexico in the event that 
the United States did not remain neutral after submarine war­
fare was resumed. In return for this alliance he was instruc­
ted to offer the Mexican Government generous financial support, 
and an understanding that Mexico was to regain her lost terri­
l 
tory in Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona. 
The telegram was not turned over to the American 
Government until February 23, 1917, when it was presented 
to Ambassador Page. The impact of the telegram was immediate. 
In fact, Polk, the Acting Secretary of State, has reported 
that Wilson was so aroused that he wanted to release it at 
once, without taking time to even think about it. Polk sug­
2 
gested that he at least wait until Lansing had been consulted. 
The telegram also aroused great indignation throughout the 
country when it was made public on March 1, 1917. The great 
propaganda value of the telegram was attested to by Spring 
Rice on March 1, when he wrote to Balfour that, "the feeling 
of exasperation against Germany is naturally growing greater 
1 
Ibid., p. 146. 
2 
Ibid., p. 169. 
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every day.1f And it was again shown on March 9th when he
 
wrote to Balfour that, "feeling in Congress was already to a 
considerable extent exasperated against Germany when the 
Mexican revelation took place. The first effect was greatly
 
2
 
to increase the irritation."
 
To the propagandists the telegram was of great value 
because it presented the war to the Americans in a different 
perspective. It now appeared not as a European war between 
Great Britain and Germany, but rather as a conflict which 
also threatened the territory of the United States. It has 
been said that after the Zimmermann telegram was released the 
Omaha World-Herald, which had tried to remain neutral, now 
stated that there could be no neutrality when the issue 
shifted from Germany against Great Britain to Germany against 
3 
the United States. And, the anti-war Detroit Times wrote: 
Regretful as the case may be, it looks like war 
for this country of ours, with only one thing left 
to praise God for, and that, if a war comes, that it 
1 
Gwynn, .QQ.. cit., p. 384. 
2 
Ibid. , p. 385. 
3 
Samuel R. Spencer, Jr., Decision for War, 1917 (Rindge, 
New Hampshire: Richard R. Smith, Publishers, 1953), pp. 80-2. 
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was not our making.
 
The disclosure of the Zimmermann telegram was such an 
effective piece of propaganda that, in the opinion of at least 
one student of the period, within a week most people became 
2 
convinced that war with Germany could not be avoided. The 
Boston Globe was said to have reflected the opinion of many 
newspapers in the country when it wrote, "if Germany wants 
3 
war with us, she shall have it. JI 
Thus, Great Britain was able to use her censorship and 
news control apparatus, in combination with her intelligence 
department, to obtain some of the most outstanding propaganda 
victories of the war. 
The goals of the British censorship and news control 
apparatus did not stop at cutting the enemies means of com­
munication, hiding the extent of German victories and Allied 
weaknesses, and using the information obtained from censor­
ship to further the cause of Great Britain. In fact, it was 
one of the major goals of this apparatus to control all of the 
1
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news going to the United States that it was possible for them 
to control. 
The British position, astride the major routes of com­
munication, of course, gave the British considerable advantage 
in this news control effort. In addition, the British had a 
second advantage in that London had always been one of the 
1 
worlds chief exchange and clearing houses for news. Thus, 
it was relatively simple for Great Britain to exert consider­
able influence on the news which passed to the United States 
from Europe. 
Most of the news bound for the United States had to 
pass over the British cables, and it was, therefore, easy 
for Great Britain to censor what stories the British did not 
want to pass. 
However, it should also be noted that Great Britain 
was also able to influence the American press in other less 
objectionable ways. By such means as official press releases, 
beautiful chateaux' at the front for correspondents and other 
1 
Villard, Q£. cit., pp. 80-1. 
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visitors, numerous press interviews with leading British 
personalities, tours of the Grant Fleet, etc., the English 
were able to influence the news passing to America. As 
Brownrigg has related, lfevery newspaper .representat~ve was,
2 3 
pace, Mr. Montgomery of the Press Bureau, most important. lf 
The British were also able to influence the news going 
to America by exercising some control over the English press. 
As most of the American newspapers were greatly dependent 
upon the advance sheets of various British newspapers for 
4 
their war news, it was possible for the English to influence 
the news bound for America by exerting some control over what 
the press in England wrote. The powers granted to the Govern­
ment by the Defense of the Realm Act gave the Press Bureau 
the authority to exercise such influence over the press in 
England. In exercising this authority the Press Bureau worked 
1 
"Governments Control of the Press," Nation, Vol. 105 
(September 13, 1917), p. 288. 
2 
"In effect."
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Brownrigg, Q£. cit., p. 95.
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e.g. The New York Times bought the advance sheets of 
The London D~il.Y""C~nWc. Elmer Da:ris, History of the New 
York Times (New York: The New York T~mes, 1921), p. 366. 
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1 
very closely with the Foreign Office. However, upon orders 
from Grey this practice was ended on December 20, 1915, in 
favor of a system whereby the publishers of the various 
newspapers were expected to shoulder the responsibility them­
selves of seeing to it that nothing was published which would 
in any way prejudice His Majesty's relations with Foreign 
2 
Powers. However, the new policy adopted by the Foreign 
Office was not adopted by the other Departments, and the 
3 p'1ll 
Press Bureau continued to censor in all other cases as before. 
Thus, such things as the sinking of the Audacious was reported 
neither in the English press or in its American counterpart. 
The propagandists also found that control over what 
the press in England wrote could be used to keep that press 
from offending the United States. Page warned the President 
of this tactic on Februrary 15, 1916, when he wrote, "the 
Cabinet has directed the Censor to suppress, as far as he 
can with prudence, comment which is unfavorable to the United 
1 
Sir Edward Cook, Th~ Press in War-Time (London: 
MacMillan and Co., 1920), p. 119. 
2 
Ibid., p. 120. 
3 
Ib id., p. 121. 
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States." And, again he wrote after the President's peace 
communication of December 18, 1916, that publications of the 
note in the British press was withheld for several hours in 
order to give the government a chance to control editorial 
opinion, "otherwise it was feared that this would be so 
unrestrained in its bitterness that relations with the United 
2 
States might be imperilled. 1I It is also interesting to note 
that Spring Rice in his letters to Grey frequently made such 
comments as, " ... the President is very sensitive to 
3 
British criticism, especially the criticism of the Spectator." 
In general the British appear to have been successful 
in their efforts to control most of the news that went to the 
4 
United States from Europe. Indeed, the reports of Sir Gilbert 
Parker to the British Cabinet reveal a satisfaction with the 
British control over the American press. According to Peterson 
the following excerpts are typical: 
1 
Page, op. cit., II, 51. 
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May 31: The American Press as a whole is fr~ d1 to
the Allied d· ~en y
an ~s anxious to give our point of view. 
August 23: The current week is remarkable for the 
large number of interviews from British sources. 
October 11: The week supplies satisfactory evidence 
of the permeation of the American press by British 
influence . . • . 1 
This view of the British success in controlling the news 
going to America was also shared by Joseph Grew, the Secre­
tary of the American legation in Berlin, who, after his family 
had sent newspaper clippings implying his gullibility, wrote 
home: 
. . . you yourselves from the first have received 
your news and impressions from one country and one 
country only. Every single cablegram to America, 
whether from hostile, neutral, or friendly countries, 
passes through England and there they are so carefully 
censored that you are absolutely in the dark as to the 
other side of the question. 2 
At this point it should be clear that Great Britain 
gained a great many successes, both propaganda and other, 
from the use of censorship and news control. In general, 
1 
Peterson, QR. cit., pp. 233-4. 
2 
Joseph C. Grew, Turbulent Era 1904-1945 (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1952), I, 158. H: was in fact 
incorrect, because cables could also come v~a France or 
Siberia. 
a 
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the goals of the censorship and news control effort were 
achieved. 
However, as the next chapter will make clear, there 
were a number of thorns among the roses of success. 
a
 
CHAPTER IV 
DRAWBACKS TO CENSORSHIP AND NEWS 
CONTROL AS A METHOD OF PROPAGANDA 
The British censorship and news control campaign was 
in reality an effort on the part of Great Britain to control 
as much as possible the information that passed back and forth 
across the Atlantic concerning the war. In this effort the 
English were for the most part successful. However, this was 
not done without causing much irritation. 
One of the very first complaints to arise in the United 
States after the outbreak of the war concerned the British 
censorship regulations. This complaint arose not from the 
general public but from those who used the British cables. 
It was found that the censorship regulations requiring plain 
language and full addresses greatly increased the cost of 
using the cables, for it was no longer possible to use 
condensation, code addresses, etc., as was the usual proce­
dure. Thus as early as August 11, 1917, Western Union 
requested that the Government of the United States make "such 
representations to the British Government as will be calculated 
to admit of a more reasonable attitude with respect to the 
4 
68 
1 
censorship of cable messages • 
. . . 
It The request from 
Western Union made note of the fact that hsuc requirements 
as full addresses and full signature had cut down the 
capacity of the cables by fifty per cent due to the increased 
length of each message, and it also noted that the company 
was forbidden from making any inquiries regarding the 
2 
delivery of messages. Page, in London, was instructed to 
make such representations to the British Government on 
3 
August 15, 1914, and similar instructions were received by 
him several times thereafter. 
This inconvenience was only a minor source of friction 
between the United States and Great Britain, but it did affect 
some of the very people and groups that the British propagan­
dists hoped to win the support of, i.e. newspapers and commer­
cia1 firms. It cannot be stated that this practice alone cost 
the propagandists the support of a certain number of newspapers 
or commercial houses, but it was not the type of procedure 
1
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which was likely to win friends. In fact, it was reported in 
Review of Reviews that one of the great New York dailies had 
sent an editor to London merely to take out needless words 
1 
from cable messages due to the higher tolls. 
Of even more importance was the irritation that censor­
ship and news control caused because of its interference with 
commercial transactions. Throughout the entire period of 
American neutrality the British policies in regard to 
neutral trade was a source of constant friction. 
As regards the British censorship one of the major 
complaints was that Great Britain was suppressing purely 
commercial messages between neutral nations. Early in the 
war Lansing notified Page that the State Department had 
received a great many complaints from throughout the nation 
in regard to the suppression by the British censors of cable 
communications to and from neutral countries. With this in 
mind he requested that Page present the matter to the Foreign 
Office with the suggestion that the State Department deemed 
1 
Villard, OR. cit., p. 79. 
4 
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it desirable ~hat the suppression of commercial messages be 
discontinued. 
The dispute was of course not solved with this early 
protest on the part of the United States, but rather it 
continued to be one of the major disputes between Great 
Britain and the United States for several years to come. 
Indeed, the protest which Great Britain received over this 
issue did not end with just the United States. Other neutral 
nations joined with the United States in objecting to the 
British practice of censoring and suppressing commercial 
messages. On November 12, 1914, Bryan notified Page that 
Danish firms were protesting that the English censorship was 
ruining business between that country and the United States, 
and it was requested by Bryan that Page present the matter 
2 
to the Foreign Office. Switzerland also joined Denmark and 
the United States in voicing protest against the British 
3 
censorship and suppression of commercial messages. 
1 
FRUS, 1914 Supplement, 2£. cit., p. 514. 
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The matter was, of course, not as completely one sided 
as it might appear, for Great Britain was apparently convinced, 
perhaps with some justification, that many of the messages 
which her censors suppressed were actually messages involving 
trade that would eventually end up in Germany. The British 
made this point clear to Ambassador Page, for, after a con­
ference with Grey and the chief censors, Page wrote to Bryan 
on December 11, 1914, r1they strongly protested that they do 
1 
not aim to impede neutral commerce. n And, he continued, 
"they say certain German banks and institutions in the United 
States have devised most ingenious codes which they use in 
2 
most innocent looking telegrams." 
This explanation of the actions of the British censors 
was, however, of no avail when confronted with American 
complaints of British interference with messages concerning 
trade with areas outside of Europe. Bryan notified Page of 
this type interference on December 22, 1914, when he related 
that the Governor General of the Philippines had reported 
1 
Ibid., p. 525. 
2 
Idem. 
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that business firms there were suffering serious loss 
due to the delay in the transmission of purely commercial 
1 
cablegrams by the British censors. Page was again informed 
of this type British interference on May 13, 1915, when 
Bryan wrote that nine cablegrams from Rio de Janeiro to 
the United States concerning coffee shipments had not been 
delivered. With this, Page was directed to bring it to the 
attention of the Foreign Office that the suppression of 
commercial messages of a neutral character between the 
United States and South America could, "only serve as a 
detriment to legitimate business entirely outside the war 
2 
1\zone . 
The censors interference with and suppression of com­
mercia1 messages was naturally a drawback to the propagan­
dists' efforts to enlist the support of the United States. 
This was especially true because of the fears and suspicions 
which this practice aroused in the minds of many Americans. 
For, in the words of Baker, "many American businessmen were 
1 
International Law Review, Ope cit., p. 297. 
2 
Ib id., p. 312. 
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convinced that their trade secrets and confidential dealings 
with Europe were becoming known to British officials and 
1 
being used for the advantage of British traders.rr 
The suspicions that England was using the trade 
secrets gained from the censorship were not without some 
justification. Incidents such as the above mentioned inter­
ferences with non-European trade would naturally lead some 
merchants to suspect that the British harboured certain 
ulterior motives for the censorship establishment. In 
addition, the long delay in the delivery of messages to 
and from Europe due to the censorship must also have led 
many to believe that the messages were being delayed to 
help British commercial interest. Lansing remarked that it 
was generally held by American businessmen that many letters 
of a purely commercial nature and unrelated to contraband 
were being copied by the censors, and that these copies 
were being forwarded to the London Board of Trade for its 
information and for such use as it might deem advisable in 
1 
Baker, Q£. cit., VI, 313. 
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1 
advancing the commercial interest of Great Britain. Suspi­
cions of this type apparently even reached into the Cabinet. 
This was evident in a May 5, 1915, letter from Secretary of 
the Interior Lane to Colonel House. In this letter Lane 
remarked, "can it be that she [England] is trying to take 
2 
advantage of the war to hamper our trade." 
Fears and suspicions of this type would, of course, 
do great injury to the propagandist's efforts in gaining the 
support of the American people. As Spring Rice warned Grey 
on September 15, 1916, "It would be very dangerous for us 
if it appeared that our assurances with regard to our policy 
toward neutrals [assurances of not using trade secrets gained 
3 
by censorship.} were not born out in fact." In order to 
counter these fears and suspicions, the British Government 
emphatically denied on several occasions that the censorship 
was being used for any purpose of this type. One such denial 
was given to Lansing on August 15, 1916, when Spring Rice 
1
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delivered the following statement: 
Any such use of censorship is directly contrary to 
the policy of His Majesty's Government and contrary to 
their orders . . . • 
His Majesty's Government have no reason to suppose 
that any such offense has actually taken place and they 
have no evidence of it . 1 
However, according to Lansing, not even the fact that 
the American Ambassador to London had denied that the British 
were engaged in such improper practices could calm the suspi­
cions, for, "the circumstances seemed to justify the suspi­
2 
cions." Thus, as a result of censorship, the propagandist 
had to deal with fears and suspicions which, in the words 
of Lansing, "worked to the direct benefit of Britain's 
3 
competitors " 
Censorship and news control also had certain draw­
backs in regard to the propagandist's efforts to gain the 
support of the American press. It cannot, of course, be 
said that censorship made the American press hostile to 
Great Britain, because generally the press in America was 
1 
FRUS, 1916 Supplement, ~. cit., p. 618. 
2 
Lansing, 9E. cit., p. 127. 
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at least somewhat favorably disposed toward Great Britain and 
the Allies. However, the censorship and news control tactics 
of the British certainly did not contribute toward that good 
will. 
In fact the American news media of the period contains 
many protests against the British censorship and news control 
practices. Generally these protests were opposed to the 
efforts of the censors and the Press Bureau in determining 
what news should be allowed to cross the Atlantic. As one 
periodical of the period summed up the situation: 
Urbane fatuity has rarely I suppose, been carried
 
further in any Government department than in the British
 
Press Bureau and by the half-pay officers who were in­

stalled at its orders in the cable companies offices.
 
These wondrous gentlemen simpl! blue-penciled everything
 
that came before them . . . .
 
Or, as the Nation commented upon the situation: 
To the wholesome indignation of the American Press,
 
it [the Press Bureau] vexatiously delays, sometimes
 
absolutely prohibits, transmission of costly cable
 
dispatches conveying news that has for days been
2broadcast in the European press. 
1 . " hAm'Sidney Brooks, "The Press in War Time, Nort . er~can 
Review, CC (December, 1914), p. 869. 
2 
"Censorship Abroad," Nation, Ie (October 29, 1914), 
p. 517. 
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In addition several of the periodicals of the era 
charged that the press censorship of Great Britain was 
depriving the news media of the ability to perform one of 
its primary functions in a democratic society--the formation 
of public opinion. The North American Review contained one 
clear example of this charge when it published the following: 
Both England and the United States are blessed with 
systems of government that give to the Press a power 
that is inconceivable in countries where everything is 
subordinated to preparing for success on the day of 
Armageddon. The press with us not only disseminates 
news, but shapes the thoughts of the nation more con­
stantly and with greater effect than any other instru­
ment . . . . That is a condition with which the military 
and naval authorities have to reckon . . . in devising 
any sort of a Press censorship. They should remember 
that in gagging the Press they are gagging not only a 
news agency, but a molder of public opinion. l 
This charge against the British censorship was also evident 
in an article published by Literary Digest. This article 
related that, when The Nation (London) was prohibited from 
entering the United States by the British censors, the Man­
chester Guardian wrote: 
. . . in newly freed Russia and in America, always 
1
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free, it is safe to assume that th~s 1 f . ~ examp e 0 Br~tish 
regard for a form of freedom hitherto h' 1 
. . somew at Jea ous1ycher~shed w~ll be received with astonishm t . 
. d l't 1 en verg~ng on ~ncre u ~ y. 
The news media and business community were not the 
only Americans to be angered by the censorship and news 
control campaign of Great Britain. Indeed a portion of the 
general population seems to have been at least somewhat 
disturbed by the censorship. 
One segment of the American population which was to a 
greater or lesser extent disturbed by the censorship was that 
part which had friends or relatives in the territory of the 
Central Powers. The censorship blocked easy communication 
between these Americans and their friends and relations 
among the Central Powers. And, it was, therefore, a constant 
source of irritation to these people. Lansing referred to 
this problem in a letter to Spring Rice on September 25, 1914, 
when he said that the State Department has received several 
complaints from American citizens to the effect that their 
letters to relatives in Germany had not reached their 
1 Literary Digest, LIV
"Too Dangerous for Us to Rea.d " 
(May 21, 1917), 1413. 
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1 
destination. Indeed, people with this problem may well 
have been the same people whose letters prompted Senator 
Stone to question the Secretary of State as to the United 
States policy toward the censorship. In this letter of 
inquiry, Senator Stone, asked among other things, why the 
United States allowed communication by submarine cable 
while it censored wireless messages, and why the United 
States tolerated the censorship, and in some cases the 
2 
destruction, of American letters found on neutral vessels. 
It may have been impossible for the propagandists to 
gain much support among this segment of the population any­
way, but, when the censorship cut them off from easy communi­
cation with their friends and relatives, even that little 
hope of success for the British propaganda was probably 
diminished. 
The mere inconvenience caused by the censorship 
probably also reduced the extent to which the propagandists 
were able to succeed in America. Spring Rice pointed to this 
1 
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problem in a letter to Grey on April 28, 1916, in which he 
said that the question of mail censorship touched upon the 
convenience of so many people that he feared that the excite­
ment it caused against Great Britain would prove to be formid­
able. And, he concluded, "we are certainly invoking on our 
1 
heads a great deal of indignation from many powerful people." 
Spring Rice repeated this fear in a letter to Lord Robert 
Cecil on August 13, 1916, in which he said that people get 
satiated with horror they do not experience, but what they do 
experience is the inconvenience; and this they resent "more 
and more." And, he concluded, "thus you will understand that 
2 
our difficulties are increasing here." 
In this regard, one student of the period has remarked 
that the German propagandists made a strong appeal to the 
American public by discussing the British interference with 
Am " t d and ma1'1 . Th1" s effort, he felt, was success­. er1canra e 
ful because it dealt with something which was of importance 
1
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1 
to the United States. It might be questioned by some 
whether German propaganda was responsible for the growing 
feeling of resentment toward Great Britain in the United 
States, but none can deny that there was such a growing 
sense of resentment toward the English in America. The 
following instruction from Lansing to Page, dated January 4, 
1916, clearly illustrates that resentment toward Great 
Britain was growing as a result of the inconvenience caused 
by censorship: 
As a result of British action, strong feeling is 
being aroused in this country on account of the loss 
of valuable letters, money orders, and drafts, and 
foreign banks are refusing to cash American drafts 
owing to the absence of any security that the drafts 
will travel safely in the mails . . . Please lay this 
matter immediately before the British Government in 
a formal and vigorous protest and press for a discon­
tinuance of these unwarranted interferences with 
invoilable mails . . . . 2 
The propagandists' problems which resulted from British 
censorship did not end with those mentioned above, for it 
should also be noted that many Americans simply resented the 
fact that the British censors were trying to control what war 
1 
Peterson, OR. cit., p. 141. 
2 
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news the American public were read1·ng. As one periodical of 
the time wrote: 
. . it is beyond the function of a foreign censor to 
say whether Americans shall or shall not receive news of 
a papal letter,l •.. and whether there is any news 2 
from Germany which British censors have a right to suppress. 
Spring Rice warned Lord Newton of this type danger early in 
the war when he commented that, people here don'tJf ••• 
like to be preached at; they like to think that they are 
3 
neutral and make up their minds . It And, the danger 
of censorship hurting the public opinion of Great Britain was 
also alluded to in a letter from Theodore Roosevelt to Grey 
on January 22, 1915. In this letter Roosevelt warned Grey 
that he should consider whether much of the censorship work 
and the British refusal to allow correspondents at the front 
was not damaging the British cause from the public opinion 
4 
standpoint without corresponding military gains. 
1 
This apparently refers to a Papal prayer ~or peace 
which the censors suppressed early in the war. V111ard, 
2£. cit., p. 81. 
2 
Idem. 
3 
Gwynn, DE. cit., p. 239. 
4 
Grey, QR. cit., p. 151. 
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However, by 1916, the situation had reached the point 
that American opinion of Great Britain was apparently on some­
what of a decline. This de l' 'B"c ~ne ~n r~t~sh prestige through­
out 1916 was said to have been reflected in the reports of 
Wellington House to the British Cabinet. These reports began 
to contain such comments as: 
February 12: British cause has recently suffered a 
slight setback in the United States. 
May 25: , .. prestige of Great Britain in this country 
is at the lowest ebb since the war began. 
September 6: There is no doubt that pro-British sym­
pathy in the United States . , . has recently undergone 
considerable modification. 
October 18: The outstanding feature of American
 
opinion at the present time is a growing feeling
 
against Great Britain. l
 
This decline in the prestige of Great Britain in the 
United States cannot be attributed solely to the irritations 
caused by the British censorship and news control effort, 
The decline in part reflected the growing conviction on the 
2 
part of many that a stalemate had been reached in the war. 
1
 
Peterson, £E. cit" pp. 286-7.
 
2 
' was the most importanthPeterson has stated that t ~s " ' 
single factor in the decline of British prest~ge ~n Amer~ca, 
4 
84
 
However, it is also clear that irritat~ h ~ons suc as those 
mentioned above would at least contr~bute t d ~ some owar the 
decline in British prestige. Thu h"s, censors ~p and news 
control were in some ways a drawback to the propagandist's 
efforts. 
Censorship and news control not only irritated the 
private citizens and business firms of the United States 
as well as those of the other neutral countries, but it also 
caused a great deal of friction between the governments of 
the United States and Great Britain. 
This friction was clearly evident in any reading of 
the diplomatic correspondence which passed between these 
two governments, and most particularly in the correspondence 
which passed between the American State Department and the 
American Ambassador in London. Throughout the entire period 
Page never ceased to receive periodic instructions from 
Washington to make protest to the British Government over 
some aspect of or incident which had occurred because of the 
British censorship. 
The Government of the United States made a considerable 
number of representations to the British Government as a 
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result of British censorship of cable messages. But, even 
more representations were made to that Government as a 
result of the censorship of the mails. With regard to the 
censorship of the cables, the United States contented itself 
to requesting clarification of the censorship regulations, and 
in certain cases to revisions in those censorship rules. 
However, in the case of mail censorship the United States 
protested that Great Britain had no right to force neutral 
vessels into British ports for purpose of search, and when 
there to subject the mails on board such vessels to local 
1 
censorship laws. The United States further contended that 
when neutral ships merely touched at British ports the 
British had no right, according to international law, to 
either remove sealed mail bags, or to censor the mails on 
2 
board ship. 
In response to these protests England normally asked 
for specific information about the particular incident of 
the protes t. However, in response to a Lansing note of 
1 
FRUS, 1916 Supplement, QQ. cit., p. 52. 
2 
Idem. 
9 
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protest dated January 4, 1916, the governments of Great 
Britain and France issued a J'oint response A '1on pr~ 3, 
1916. This response gave several justifications for the 
British censorship actions, these were: (1) Germany had not 
only censored mails, but had actually sunk mail boats with­
out American protest, (2) the British and French contended 
that the mails contained contraband of war bound for Germany, 
(3) it was further stated that the Allies would pass actual 
correspondence, but that they reserved the right to inspect 
the mails to insure that it was in fact correspondence, and 
(4) it was contended that the Hague convention did not bar 
them from stopping contraband of war, and that it was neces­
sary for them to search the mails to stop the contraband 
1 
which might be contained therein. 
With this impass, the relations between the United 
States and Great Britain began to deteriorate during much 
of the remainder of the year 1916, 
The efforts of the British propagandists to enlist the 
support of the United States thus suffered a great deal in 
1 
Ibid., pp. 599-600. 
4 
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1916 as a result of the censorship and news control campaign. 
Indeed, it is significant that Spring Rice repeatedly urged 
his government to make concessions whenever necessary. The 
strain in relations between the United States and Great 
Britain, and Spring Rice's urging for concessions are evi­
dent in the following Spring Rice letter to Lord Cecil, dated 
August 13, 1916: 
Do not depend solely on official reports nor solely 
on unofficial reports. But obtain independent infor­
mation from as many sides as possible. The object 
should be to ascertain when the breaking point is near 
and where. Do not deceive yourself as to that. If it 
approaches you may have to concede a point or two. l 
The concern of Spring Rice was again apparent in a letter to 
Lord Grey dated September 15, 1916, in which he related that 
he had just seen a good friend at the State Department who 
bursted out in, "a long and violent diatribe against all our 
proceedings, which he said were doing us more harm than the 
Germans had ever done." And, Spring Rice continued, his 
friend was kno\¥n as being rather "pro-a11Y" . . . . "The 
2
 
, . 'f' t II
case ~s s~gn~ ~can . 
1 
ZGwynn, QE. cit., p. 345.
 
Ibid., p. 349.
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The fears of Spring Rice seemed to reflect the mood 
of Washington during much of 1916. For, it is evident that 
the Administration was becoming greatly concerned over the 
controversies with Great Britain. As Page later remarked 
in regard to his September 1916 interview with Wilson, "he 
showed a great degree of toleration for Germany; and he was, 
during the whole morning that I talked with him, complaining 
1 
of England." While Colonel House wrote, after a meeting 
with Captain Guy Gaunt on May 23, 1916, that he was told 
that the British Ambassador was much exercised at the harsh­
ness of the American note on mail seizures and he was told 
that the Ambassador thought that the same objective might 
have been accomplished by a softer tone. In response to 
this, House recorded that he was not sure that the Ambassador 
was right, "it looks as if a club was necessary before they 
2 
take any notice." 
With such attitudes prevalent in the Administration, 
it can seriously be questioned whether the censorship was 
1 
Hendrick, QE.. cit., II, 222. 
2 
Seymour, QQ_ cit., II, 310. 
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doing the British more good than harm. Apparently Spring 
Rice did not think the censorship and news control effort 
to be worthwhile, for he wrote in August, 1916 that it 
might be well to consider whether it is worthwhile to insist 
on the telegraph and news censorship on press messages and 
j ouma1s of German origin. For he continued, "I think that 
the American people are rather apt to resent having their 
views ready made for them, and the German press campaign 
1 
may do the Germans more harm than good." 
At this point it should be clear that there were many 
thorns among the successes which the British propagandists 
were able to achieve through the use of censorship and news 
control. It remains the task of the final chapter to conclude 
which was the more important--the roses or the thorns. 
1 
Gwynn, 2£. cit., p. 346. 
-------"1
 
CHAPTER V
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
 
In summarizing a study of the use of censorship and 
news control as a method of propaganda, it must first be 
made clear that propaganda was not the sole justification 
for the existence of the censoring apparatus. As censorship 
and news control was useful to the propagandists, it was also 
of considerable value to the military aspects of the war. 
For, censorship could be, and was, used to prevent valuable 
information from falling into enemy hands. And, censorship 
was also of great value in aiding the British blockade of 
Germany. Thus, by contributing toward the disruption of the 
enemies' much needed foreign trade, censorship contributed 
toward the eventual military defeat of the enemy, 
However, as propaganda is the theme of this thesis, it 
is, of course, necessary to point out that censorship and 
news control did serve as a useful tool in the hands of the 
British propagandists. It gave the propagandists considerable 
advantage over his German counterpart from the very beginning 
' was able to exert considerablein that the British propagand~st 
To thecontrol over his enemies methods of communication. 
9 
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propagnadist, the value of being able to control much of the 
communication bound for his German counterpart in the United 
States cannot be over estimated. 
Not only did the censorship and news control enable 
the British propagandist to exert control over the enemies 
means of communication, but it also enabled him to hide from 
the American public much of the German success on the field 
of battle. Along with this, censorship and news control 
also enabled the propagandist to hide the extent of his 
weaknesses from the public he was attempting to win to his 
cause. Apparently on the assumption that no one would care 
to risk supporting a loosing cause. 
It has also been noted that censorship and news control 
enabled the British propagandist to gain valuable information 
concerning the activities of his enemy. This, the British 
propagandists were able, at least in a few cases, to turn 
into some of the most outstanding propaganda achievements of 
the war. This was particularly the case in such propaganda 
victories as the Archibald revelation and the Zimmermann 
Telegram release. 
1 
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The many uses for which the propagandists were able 
to make of censorship and news control dl.·d not stop here. 
For, they were able to use this apparatus w;th a . 
L cons~derable 
amount of success in no less an effort than that of control­
ling as much as possible all of the war news bound for the 
United States from the scene of the conflict. 
However, in summarizing the use of censorship and news 
control as a method of propaganda, it must also be pointed 
out that it brought with it many drawbacks, some of which 
were considerable in their magnitude. 
The first of these drawbacks in the use of censorship 
was that the regulations imposed by the censors created much 
irritation for those who used the cables as a means of communi­
cation. This, because of the increased cost of cabling due 
to the prohibiting of the normal methods of condensation, and 
also because the sender was not notified in cases where the 
censors refused to permit the delivery of certain cablegrams. 
To this it must also be added that censorship created 
much irritation among the American commercial interests 
because of the delays caused by the censorship, and in certain 
cases the refusal of the censors to pass given telegrams. 
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Irritations of this type were of importance to the propagan­
dists because they most affected some of the key segments of 
the American society which the propagandists hoped to win to 
the British cause--i.e., businessmen and newspapers. 
Censorship was also a major drawback to the propagan­
dists efforts to gain support among the American people 
because of the fears and suspicions which it aroused. It 
became the conviction of many American citizens that the 
British were using secrets gained from the censorship to 
advance British commercial interests at the expense of 
1 
American business. 
Censorship and news control, of course, created a 
certain amount of resentment in the American press. That 
important body of Americans generally felt that the censors 
of a foreign country had no right to determine what news was 
safe and what was not for Americans to read. And, part of 
this group was apparently of the opinion that the British 
censorship and news control was depriving them of their 
ability to perfollll their task as one of the leading opinion 
1 
Baker, loco cit. 
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makers in a democratic society. 
-Of course, censorship and news control also angered 
many average American citizens, who felt, as did the press, 
that it was not proper for the Government of a foreign nation 
to exercise control over what they were to read. To the 
British propagandists this type of resentment was of course 
an obstacle in the path of his efforts to win the support 
of the American people. 
But, perhaps the greatest drawback created by the use 
of censorship and news control was the friction it caused 
between the Government of Great Britain and the Government 
of the United States. This friction became so great in 1916, 
that Colonel House, as has already been noted, came to feel 
that it might be necessary to use a "club" in order to main­
tain the rights of a neutral. 
One thing should be clear at this point, and that is 
that there were a great number of both advantages and disad­
vantages in the use of censorship and news control as a method 
of 1't 1'S, of course, difficult to determinepropaganda, And, 
whether one of these factors outweighted the other, 
h' dews controlIt is readily apparent that censors 1p an n 
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were of great utility to the propagandist in his efforts to 
enlist the support of the United States. As one student of 
British--American relations has pointed out, in the period 
of American neutrality, except for a period in 1916, the 
pro-Ally sentiment in the United States steadily increased 
throughout the war. This increase in pro-Ally sentiment 
Allen attributed to the British propaganda effort, and most 
especially to the British use of censorship and news control. 
British censorship, he maintained, so disrupted the enemies 
means of communication that the British view of any situation 
had normally been accepted in America long before the German 
1 
view had even arrived. 
It might, however, he added that this and similar 
views may be guilty of some exageration, because censorship, 
news control, and propaganda were not the only factors which 
contributed toward an increase in pro-Ally sentiment in the 
United States. The huge increase in trade between the United 
States and Britain, coupled with a sharp drop in German-
had a certain impact upon American trade , would natura11y have 
1 
C Allen Great Britain and the United.States 
H. S·t. Ma.r.t'i 1'S Press, Inc., 1955), pp. 652-3.(New York: 1-L 
••••• 
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the attitudes which Americans h ld 1e toward these two nations. 
It should also be pointed out that German mistakes , whether 
in the realm of propaganda or of military action, also had 
an impact on American sentiment. Thus, such events as the 
invasion of Belgium and the sinking of the Lusitania aided 
pro-Ally sentiment in America. In addition, it should also 
be noted that France, who had aided America in its' revolution, 
was one of the Allies. Certainly this did not hurt British 
sentiment in America. 
In the final analysis, it must also be remembered that 
propaganda was not the sale reason for the existence of British 
censorship. As was pointed out earlier, censorship was of 
considerable value to the military. 
However, it can be questioned as to whether the gains 
thus achieved justified the risks which were taken because of 
censorship and news control. For there was always a possi­
b 'l' ' d S m-ight use a "club" to gain its' ~ ~ty that the Un~te tates ~
 
rights as a neutral. Lansing spoke of one such possibility
 
when he wrote: 
I have wondered sometimes what would have been the 
result if ... Bernstorff's advice had prevailed 
97 
and if submarine warfare had been abandoned . .
 
Would not the American people become m d' .

. . are an more 
1rr1tated at the British disregard for th' . h? e1r r1g ts 
. . . . Could a clash with the British navy have been 
avoided? And would a clash have resulted in war?l 
Senator Hoke Smith, a spokesman for southern cotton-growers, 
spoke of a second possible "club" when he warned the Presi­
dent that it might be difficult to prevent the next Congress 
from passing an embargo resolution if England and France did 
2 
not modify their interferences with neutral rights. 
Through the use of that marvelous instrument called 
hindsight, it is now, of course, apparent that Great Britain 
was able to reap many of the benefits to be had from censor­
ship and news control without suffering all of the possible 
consequences. Yet, even with this knowledge, it is difficult 
to determine whether the gains were worth the irritations and 
risks involved in censorship and news control. 
It might even be questioned whether at least one of the 
propaganda techniques was not in error in its' basic assump­
tion. It has been shown that the British used censorship and 
1 
Lansing, 2£. £it., p. 41. 
2 
Seymour, gQ. cit., II, 70. 
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news control in an effort to hide German victories and thus 
to make it appear as though the Allies were bound to win. 
This technique was apparently based upon the assumption that 
it would be good for morale if it appeared that the British 
cause was winning. However, it is possible that such pro­
paganda might have bred complacency rather than the hoped 
for high morale. After all, success was "inevitable." 
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